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Abstract
We give easy proofs of some recent results concerning threshold gaps in ramp schemes. We
then generalise a construction method for ramp schemes employing error-correcting codes so that
it can be applied using nonlinear (as well as linear) codes. Finally, as an immediate consequence
of these results, we provide a new explicit bound on the the minimum length of a code having
a specified distance and dual distance.
1 Introduction
Suppose that t1, t2 and n are positive integers such that t1 < t2 ≤ n. Informally, a (t1, t2, n)-ramp
scheme is a method whereby a dealer distributes a share to each of n players such that the following
two properties are satisfied:
reconstruction Any subset of t2 players can compute a unique secret from the shares that they
collectively hold
secrecy No subset of t1 players can determine any information about the secret.
We call t1 and t2 the lower threshold and upper threshold of the scheme, respectively.
When t2 = t1 + 1, the ramp scheme is known as a (t2, n)-threshold scheme. Ramp schemes were
defined by Blakley and Meadows [2] and much basic information about ramp schemes can be found
in [3, 12, 23]. Ramp schemes have found numerous applications in cryptography and information
security over the years, including broadcast encryption [24], secure multiparty computation [5] and
error decodable secret sharing [19].
∗D. Stinson’s research is supported by NSERC discovery grant 203114-11
1
Cascudo, Cramer and Xing [4] proved the interesting result that t2 − t1 ≥ (n − t1 + 1)/2λ∗ in
any (t1, t2, n)-ramp scheme, where λ
∗ is the average length of a share. When every player’s share
space has cardinality q and and all shares are equally likely to be chosen for each player, the bound
takes the form n − t1 + 1 ≤ q(t2 − t1). We refer to the first version of the bound as the entropy
bound and the second version as the combinatorial bound. The proof of the entropy bound in [4] is
rather lengthy, so we thought it would be of interest to provide a very short, elementary proof of
the combinatorial bound.1 It is quite straightforward to modify our combinatorial proof to obtain
a proof of the entropy bound; however, this (obviously) requires introducing some basic entropy
notions from information theory, and we do not pursue this theme here.
We also provide a simple, general treatment of construction methods for ramp schemes using
both linear and nonlinear codes (previous constructions in the literature only made use of linear
codes). We also construct some new ramp schemes that are optimal with respect to the threshold
gap bound. Finally, as an immediate consequence of these results, we provide a new explicit bound
on the the minimum length of a code having a specified distance and dual distance. We also show
that there are infinite classes of codes that are optimal with respect to this bound.
2 The Threshold Gap Bound
Suppose we have a (1, t, n)-ramp scheme where the share space S = {1, . . . , q}. A distribution rule
r is written as an n-tuple with entries from S, i.e., r = (r1, . . . , rn), where ri is the share given to
player Pi. Let the secret space be K = {1, . . . , q′} where q′ > 1. For any K ∈ K, let FK denote the
collection of distribution rules corresponding to the secret having the value K. We do not require
that all the n-tuples in FK are distinct. Denote F = ∪K∈KFK .
Given any share S, the secrecy condition of a (1, t, n)-ramp scheme requires that Pr[K|S] =
Pr[K] for all K ∈ K. By Bayes’ Theorem, this is equivalent to Pr[S|K] = Pr[S], so Pr[S|K] is
independent of K. Note that taking multiple copies of each distribution rule in any FK does not
change Pr[S|K]. Suppose that |FK1 | = L1 and |FK2 | = L2 where L2 6= L1. Let L = lcm(L1, L2).
If we take L/L1 copies of every distribution rule in FK1 and L/L2 copies of every rule in FK2 , then
we have |FK1 | = |FK2 | = L.
Now we can rephrase the secrecy condition in a combinatorial form: there exist non-negative
integers λi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ q, such that
|{r ∈ FK : ri = j}| = λi,j
for K = K1,K2. Observe that
q∑
j=1
λi,j = L
for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Suppose we define
µ(r, s) = |{i : ri = si}|
for any r, s ∈ F . By the reconstruction condition, it is required that t shares determine a unique
value of the secret. Therefore, it follows that µ(r, s) ≤ t− 1 if r ∈ FK1 and s ∈ FK2 .
1After the original version of our paper was posted on the IACR ePrint Archive, Ronald Cramer informed us
(private communication) that he also had a specialised proof of the combinatorial bound; this proof is presented in
the updated version of [4].
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For any r ∈ F , define
f(r) =
n∑
i=1
λi,ri .
Lemma 2.1. If r ∈ F , then f(r) ≤ L(t− 1).
Proof. Suppose r ∈ FK1 . We have that∑
s∈FK2
µ(r, s) =
n∑
i=1
|{s ∈ FK2 : ri = si}|
=
n∑
i=1
λi,ri
= f(r).
However, µ(r, s) ≤ t− 1 for all s ∈ FK2 , so we have that f(r) ≤ |FK2 |(t− 1) = L(t− 1).
Theorem 2.2. If a (1, t, n)-ramp scheme has a share space of cardinality q, then n ≤ q(t− 1).
Proof. We compute upper and lower bounds on the sum
∑
r∈FK1 f(r). First, we have∑
r∈FK1
f(r) =
∑
r∈FK1
n∑
i=1
λi,ri
=
n∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
∑
r∈FK1 :ri=j
λi,j
=
n∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
(λi,j)
2
≥
∑n
i=1
(∑q
j=1 λi,j
)2
q
=
nL2
q
.
Second, from Lemma 2.1, we have that∑
r∈FK1
f(r) ≤ L2(t− 1).
Combining the upper and lower bounds, we have
nL2
q
≤ L2(t− 1),
which simplifies to yield the desired result.
Before proving the main theorem, we need a preliminary lemma.
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Lemma 2.3. If there exists a (t1, t2, n)-ramp scheme having a share space of cardinality q, then
there exists a (t1 − 1, t2 − 1, n− 1)-ramp scheme having a share space of cardinality q.
Proof. Let Fx consist of all the distribution rules r ∈ F for which rn = x for some fixed share x
where λn,x > 0. Then define
G = {(r1, . . . , rn−1) : r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Fx}.
It is easy to see that G comprises a set of distribution rules for a (t1− 1, t2− 1, n− 1)-ramp scheme
having a share space of cardinality q.
We can now prove the main result from [4].
Theorem 2.4. If a (t1, t2, n)-ramp scheme has a share space of cardinality q, then n − t1 + 1 ≤
q(t2 − t1).
Proof. The proof is by induction on t1, applying Lemma 2.3 and Theorem 2.2.
A ramp scheme that meets the bound of Theorem 2.4 with equality will be termed gap-optimal.
We observe that it is easy to find examples of gap-optimal ramp schemes with t1 = 1.
Theorem 2.5. For all integers t, q ≥ 2, there exists a gap-optimal (1, t, n)-ramp scheme having a
share space of cardinality q.
Proof. Let n = q(t− 1), S = Zq and K = {K1,K2}. For any integer m, define v(i,m) ∈ Sm to be
the m-tuple all of whose entries are equal to i. Now let
F1 = {v(i, n) : i ∈ S}
and let
F2 = {v(i, t− 1) ‖ v(i+ 1 mod q, t− 1) ‖ · · · ‖ v(i− 1 mod q, t− 1) : i ∈ S}.
For example, if q = t = 3, then
FK1 = {(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)}
and
FK2 = {(1, 1, 2, 2, 0, 0), (2, 2, 0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2)}.
It can be verified that FK1 and FK2 comprise distribution rules for a (1, t, q(t−1))-ramp scheme
having a share space of cardinality q and a secret space of cardinality two.
It is more difficult to find examples of gap-optimal ramp schemes when t1 ≥ 2; however, we will
give some examples with t1 = 2 in Section 3.
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2.1 Orthogonal Array Bounds
An orthogonal array OAλ(t,m, q) is a λq
t×m array A of symbols chosen from a set X of cardinality
q, such that, within any t columns of A, every ordered t-tuple of symbols occurs in exactly λ rows
of A. The parameter t is often called the strength of the orthogonal array. Orthogonal arrays have
been studied extensively for over 60 years; for an extensive treatment of these objects, see Hedayat,
Sloane and Stufken [11].
An ideal threshold scheme is one in which the share space and secret space have the same
cardinality. It is well-known (see, for example, [7]) that an ideal (t, n)-threshold scheme with a
share space of cardinality q is equivalent to an OA1(t, n+ 1, q). In this case, Theorem 2.4 tells us
that n ≤ q + t− 1. It may be of interest to note that this special case of Theorem 2.4 is a classical
orthogonal array bound (from 1952) known as the “Bush Bound”. The standard proof of the Bush
bound consists of two parts:
1. A proof that an OA1(2, n, q) exists only if n ≤ q + 1.
2. A proof that an OA1(t, n, q) implies the existence of an OA1(t− 1, n− 1, q).
The proof of 1. is in fact similar to, but even simpler than the proof of Theorem 2.2. It is interesting
to note that the bound in 1. also follows immediately from the more complicated “Rao Bound”,
which was first proven in 1947. Finally, the proof of 2. is basically identical to that of Lemma 2.3.
For details of the proofs of these and related bounds, see [11].
3 Codes and Ramp Schemes
Constructions of secret sharing schemes and ramp schemes from linear codes have been used for
over 30 years. The basic idea is to start with a suitable linear code, let one or more designated
coordinates in each codeword define the secret, and let the remaining coordinates define the shares.
The first result along this line is due to McEliece and Sarwate [22] in 1981, who applied this idea
using Reed-Solomon codes. They were also the first to suggest using more than one coordinate to
define the secret, which was actually the first published construction of a ramp scheme. Massey [20]
pointed out the connection between properties of the access structure of a secret sharing scheme
and codewords in the dual code of the linear code that is used to construct the scheme.
When using a linear code C to construct a ramp scheme, useful information about the thresholds
t1 and t2 follows from the the minimum distance (i.e., the minimum weight of a nonzero codeword)
of C and its dual code, C⊥. Specifically, it was noted by Sudan [25] in 2001 that one obtains a
(t1, t2, n − 1)-ramp scheme with t1 = d∗ − 2 and t2 = n − d + 1, where C has distance d, C⊥ has
distance d∗ and these codes have length n. This result concerned the case where a single coordinate
in each codeword is used to define the secret. Chen et al. [6, Section 4.1] generalised this result
to use multiple coordinates to define the secret (thereby increasing the information rate of the
resulting ramp scheme). Finally, some papers have used properties other than distance to find
bounds on the parameters of the constructed ramp schemes. For example, [14] employs the notion
of “relative generalized hamming weight” in this context.
In this section, we generalise the construction technique described above so that it can be
applied to nonlinear as well as linear codes. The fundamental tool is the concept of dual distance
as introduced by Delsarte [8, 9]. First, we give some basic definitions relating to codes: A code
C of length n over an alphabet Γ of cardinality q is a subset of Γn. The n-tuples in C are termed
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codewords. The distance of C, denoted by d, is the minimum hamming distance between any two
distinct codewords. The code C is a linear code if Γ is a finite field and C is a vector subspace of
Γn. The code is a binary code if q = 2. Much information about codes can be found in standard
textbooks, such as [1, 16, 18]. All the codes we require in this paper can be found in one or more
of these textbooks, unless otherwise noted.
Here is the definition of dual distance of a code: suppose A(C) is the distance distribution of a
code C and A′(C) is the MacWilliams transform of A(C) (for more details, see [9]). Then the dual
distance of C is the smallest positive integer d′ such that A′d′(C) 6= 0. This definition applies to
nonlinear as well as linear codes. It is well-known that the dual distance of a linear code is in fact
equal to the distance of the dual code. Delsarte proved the following fundamental result:
Lemma 3.1. [8, 9] Suppose C is a code of length n, on an alphabet of size q, having dual distance
d∗. Then the |C| × n array consisting of all the codewords in C is an OAλ(t, n, q), where t = d∗ − 1
and λ = |C|/qt.
Now we present the construction of a ramp scheme from an arbitrary (linear or nonlinear) code.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose C is a code of length n having distance d and dual distance d∗. Let
1 ≤ s ≤ d∗ − 2. Then there is a (t1, t2, n − s)-ramp scheme having information rate s, where
t1 = d
∗ − s− 1 and t2 = n− d+ 1.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, it follows that the |C| × n array consisting of all the codewords in C is an
orthogonal array of strength t = d∗ − 1. Suppose the last s co-ordinates of each codeword define
the secret and the remaining n− s coordinates specify shares for n− s participants. Therefore, we
define
F(rn−s+1,...,rn) = {(r1, . . . , rn−s) : (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ C}
for all (rn−s+1, . . . , rn) ∈ Ss. Given any t − s shares and any K, there are exactly λ = |C|/qt
distribution rules in FK having the specified t− s shares; this follows immediately because C is an
orthogonal array of strength t. On the other hand, given any n − d + 1 shares, it is easy to show
that there is at most one distribution rule containing the specified shares. For, if there existed two
distribution rules containing n − d + 1 given shares, then the distance between the corresponding
codewords would be at most d− 1, which is a contradiction.
The above construction allows one to easily find ramp schemes for a wide variety of parameter
situations by using “off-the-shelf” codes. We briefly discuss a few examples of interest. First we
give the “classic” construction of ramp schemes using Reed-Solomon codes from [22].
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that q is a prime power and 1 ≤ s < t ≤ n ≤ q + 1. Then there exists a
(t1, t2, n− s)-ramp scheme over Fq having information rate s, where t1 = t− s and t2 = t.
Proof. If q is a prime power and 1 ≤ t ≤ n ≤ q + 1, then there is a Reed-Solomon code defined
over Fq, having length n, dimension t, distance n− t+ 1 and dual distance t+ 1. Let s ≤ t− 1 and
apply Theorem 3.2. We obtain a (t1, t2, n− s)-ramp scheme, where t1 = t− s and t2 = t.
Remark. In the above-constructed ramp scheme, the share space has cardinality qs, which yields
the optimal information rate (e.g., see [12]). When s = 1, we obtain the Shamir threshold scheme.
Algebraic geometry codes (AG codes) provide a rich source of ramp schemes; this approach was
first described in [5]. In [5], the goal was to construct sequences of ramp schemes having certain
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“multiplicative” properties; among other things, this required a careful algebraic analysis of the
constructed codes. However, if one wishes to construct a single “basic” ramp scheme from an AG
code, it of course suffices to determine minimum distance and dual distance of the obtained codes.
This is what we do here, basing our presentation on the simple treatment of AG codes given by
van Lint [17]. The resulting ramp scheme has the same thresholds as the schemes in [5].
The starting point of van Lint’s approach is an irreducible nonsingular projective curve of genus
g having n + 1 rational points (i.e., points whose coordinates are in Fq). Take m to be an integer
such that 2g − 2 < m < n. Under these assumptions, there is an AG code of length n, dimension
m− g+ 1, distance d ≥ n−m and dual distance d∗ ≥ m− 2g+ 2. Then an application of Theorem
3.2 immediately yields a ramp scheme with t2 = m+ 1 and t1 = m− 2g.
Next, we give a new construction for ramp schemes that makes use of Reed-Muller codes. (We
note that Reed-Muller codes have recently been employed to construct arithmetic codices in [10].)
For 0 ≤ r ≤ m, an r-th order Reed-Muller code, denoted R(r,m), is a binary linear code having
length n = 2m and distance d = 2m−r. For 0 ≤ r < m, the dual code of R(r,m) is R(m− r−1,m),
and so the dual distance of R(r,m) is d∗ = 2r+1. Setting s = 1 in Theorem 3.2, we obtain the
following.
Theorem 3.4. For 0 ≤ r < m, there exists a (2r+1 − 2, 2m − 2m−r + 1, 2m − 1)-ramp scheme over
a binary alphabet, having information rate 1.
The above construction is of particular interest because it yields an infinite class of gap-optimal
ramp schemes with t1 = 2.
Corollary 3.5. For m ≥ 2, there exists a gap-optimal (2, 2m−1 + 1, 2m − 1)-ramp scheme over a
binary alphabet, having information rate 1.
Proof. Setting r = 1 in Theorem 3.4, the result is a (t1, t2, n)-ramp scheme over a binary alphabet,
where t1 = 2, t2 = 2
m−1 + 1 and n = 2m − 1. Since
q(t2 − t1) = 2m − 2 = n− t1 + 1,
the scheme is gap-optimal.
We finish this section by presenting a simple application of Theorem 3.2 that makes use of
nonlinear codes. Let r ≥ 3 be odd. The Kerdock code K(r+ 1) is a nonlinear binary code of length
n = 2r+1 having distance d = 2r − 2(r−1)/2 and dual distance d∗ = 6.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose r ≥ 3 is odd and 1 ≤ s ≤ 4. Then there exists a (t1, t2, n−s)-ramp scheme
over a binary alphabet, having information rate s, where t1 = 5 − s, t2 = 2r + 2(r−1)/2 + 1 and
n = 2r+1.
4 A New Bound on Codes with Specified Distance and Dual Dis-
tance
We combine two previously discussed results in order to obtain a new bound on codes having
specified distance and dual distance:
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Theorem 4.1. Suppose C is a code of length n, on an alphabet of size q, having distance d and
dual distance d∗ Then
d ≤ q − 1
q
(n− d∗ + 2) + 1. (1)
Proof. From the hypothesized code, we get a (t1, t2, n − 1)-ramp scheme having a share space of
cardinality q, where t1 = d
∗ − 2 and t2 = n − d + 1, by applying Theorem 3.2. Now we apply
Theorem 2.4, which yields
(n− 1)− (d∗ − 2) + 1 ≤ q(n− d+ 1− (d∗ − 2)),
or
n− d∗ + 2 ≤ q(n− d− d∗ + 3).
This simplifies to give the desired result.
We also note that a bound having a similar flavour was proven much earlier (in 1973) by Delsarte
[9], namely,
d ≤ n− d∗ + 2. (2)
Matsumoto et al. [21] studied the function N(d, d∗), which denotes the minimum length n of a
linear binary code having distance d and dual distance d∗. (Their motivation was an application
to the construction of certain boolean functions; see [15].) Several lower bounds for N(d, d∗)
were proven in [21], and constructions for small codes meeting some of these bounds were given.
Additional work along this line can be found in [13].
If we set q = 2 in (1), then we obtain the following new bound on N(d, d∗):
Corollary 4.2.
N(d, d∗) ≥ 2d+ d∗ − 4. (3)
The bound (3) is apparently unrelated to the bounds proven in [21]. The strongest bounds in
[21] are linear programming bounds. As such, they cannot be considered to be explicit bounds,
becuase a different LP has to be solved for every new parameter case in order to evaluate the
bound. The bound (3) is, in general, not as strong as the linear programming bounds, but it is a
very simple explicit bound which is often fairly close to the LP bounds.
We also note that the bound (3) holds for nonlinear as well as linear codes. The work in
[21, 13] only considers linear codes, though some of the bounds proven in those papers also hold
for nonlinear codes.
4.1 Examples
In this section, we give some examples of infinite classes of codes for which the bounds we proved
above are tight. The allows the exact determination of N(d, 3) and N(d, 4) for infinitely many
values of d.
A simplex code is a linear code of dimension k over the alphabet Fq (it is in fact the dual of the
hamming code). Its length is n = (qk − 1)/(q − 1), it has distance d = qk−1 and its dual distance
d∗ = 3. It is easy to verify that a simplex code meets the bound (1) with equality, because
q − 1
q
(n− d∗ + 2) + 1 = q − 1
q
(
qk − 1
q − 1 − 3 + 2
)
+ 1 = qk−1.
Setting q = 2, we immediately obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.3. N(2m, 3) = 2m+1 − 1 for all integers m ≥ 1.
Analogously, from a first-order Reed-Muller code (see Section 3), we obtain the following.
Theorem 4.4. N(2m, 4) = 2m+1 for all integers m ≥ 1.
We refer again to the Kerdock codes as an interesting example involving nonlinear codes. As
mentioned in Section 3, the Kerdock code K(r+ 1) has length n = 2r+1, distance d = 2r − 2(r−1)/2
and dual distance d∗ = 6, where r is odd. Here we have
2d+ d∗ − 4 = 2r+1 − 2(r+1)/2 + 2 = n−√n+ 2,
so the parameters of these codes are fairly close to the bound given in (3).
5 Summary
The main contributions of this paper are:
• a simplified proof of the threshold gap bound for ramp schemes,
• a simple, general construction of ramp schemes from nonlinear as well as linear codes, and
• a new bound on the length of codes having specified distance and dual distance.
One main topic for additional research is to find additional examples of ramp schemes and codes
that meet the proven bounds with equality.
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